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The Totalizing Quest of Meaning*

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There is no such thing as documentary—which the term designates a category of material, a genre, an approach, or a set of techniques. This assertion—as old and as fundamental as the antagonism between names and reality—needs incessantly to be restated despite the very visible existence of a documentary tradition. In film, such a tradition, far from undergoing a crisis today, is likely to fortify itself through its very recurrence of declines and rebirths. The narratives that attempt to unify/purify its practices by positing evolution and continuity from one period to the next are numerous indeed, relying heavily on traditional historicist concepts of periodization.

Nothing is poorer than a truth expressed as it was thought.

Walter Benjamin

In a completely catalogued world, cinema is often reified into a corpus of traditions. Its knowledge can constitute its destruction, unless the game keeps on changing its rules, never convinced of its closures, and always eager to outplay itself in its own principles. On the one hand, truth is produced, induced, and extended according to the regime in power. On the other, truth lies in between all regimes of truth. As the fable goes, What I Tell You Three Times Is True. To question the image of a historicist account of documentary as a continuous unfolding does not necessarily

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mean championing discontinuity; and to resist meaning does not necessarily lead to its mere denial. Truth, even when “caught on the run,” does not yield itself either in names or in (filmic) frames; and meaning should be prevented from coming to closure at what is said and what is shown. Truth and meaning: the two are likely to be equated with one another. Yet, what is put forth as truth is often nothing more than a meaning. And what persists between the meaning of something and its truth is the interval, a break without which meaning would be fixed and truth concealed. This is perhaps why it is so difficult to talk about it, the interval. About the cinema. About. The words will not ring true. Not true, for what is one to do with films which set out to determine truth from falsity while the visibility of this truth lies precisely in the fact that it is false? How is one to cope with a “film theory” that can never theorize “about” film, but only with concepts that film raises in relation to concepts of other practices?

A man went to a Taoist temple and asked that his fortune be told. “First,” said the priest, “you must donate incense money, otherwise the divination might not be as accurate as possible. Without such a donation, in fact, none of it will come true!”

“The Words Will Not Ring True.”
Wit and Humor from Old Cahay

Concepts are no less practical than images or sound. But the link between the name and what is named is conventional, not phenomenal. Producing film theory (or rather, philosophizing with film), which is not making films, is also a practice—a related but different practice—for theory does have to be (de)constructed as it (de)constructs its object of study. Whereas concepts in cinema are not ready-mades and do not preexist in cinema, they are not theory about cinema either. The setting up of practice against theory, and vice versa, is at best a tool for reciprocal challenge, but like all binary oppositions, it is caught in the net of positivist thinking whose impetus is to supply answers at all costs, thereby limiting both theory and practice to a process of totalization. I'm sorry, if we're going to use words we should be accurate in our use of them. It isn't a question of technique, it is a question of the material. If the material is actual, then it is documentary. If the material is invented, then it is not documentary. . . . If you get so muddled up in your use of the term, stop using it. Just talk about films. Anyway, very often when we use these terms, they only give us an opportunity to avoid really discussing the film (Lindsay Anderson).

In the general effort to analyze film and to produce “theory about film,” there is an unavoidable tendency to reduce film theory to an area of specialization and of expertise, one that serves to constitute a discipline. There is also advocacy of an Enlightenment and “bourgeois” conception of language, which holds that the means of communication is the word, its object factual, its addressee a human subject (the linear, hierarchical order of things in a world of reification)—whereas, language as the “medium” of communication in its most radical sense, “only communicates itself in itself.” The referential function of language is thus not negated, but freed from its false identification with the phenomenal world and from its assumed authority as a means of cognition about that world. Theory can be the very place where this negative knowledge about the reliability of theory’s own operative principles is made accessible, and where theoretical categories like all classificatory schemes keep on being voided, rather than appropriated, reiterated, safeguarded.

How true is the film theorist’s divination? As Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (a name among many others) would probably defend in her devalued status as a woman in the Church, “true” knowledge has to be separated from its instrumental use. The link between money and fact surfaces in the very instances where it either goes unacknowledged or is adamantly denied. The question of quality in accuracy and truth seems to depend largely on the weight or on the quantity of donation money—incense money, as the priest specifies. Indeed, some of the questions invariably burned in film public debates with the filmmaker are: What’s the shooting ratio? What’s the budget? How long did it take you to complete the film? The higher the bet, the better the product; the larger the amount of money involved, the more valuable the film, the more believable the truth it holds out. The longer the time spent, the more the value, the more reliable the information. Filmwork is a de facto “low-budget” or “big-budget” product. This is what one constantly hears and has come to say it oneself. “Low-tech,” “high-tech,” “high-class junk,” “low-grade footage.” Pressure, money, bigness does it all . . . The widespread slogan in factual and “alternative” realms may claim “the larger the grain, the better the politics,” but what exclusively circulates in mass-media culture is undoubtedly, the money image. Money as money and money as capital are often spoken of as one, not two. The problem of financial constraints is, however, not only a problem of money but also one of control and standardization of images and sounds. Which truth? Whose truth? How true? (Andy Warhol’s renowned statement rings very true: “Buying is much more American than thinking.”) In the name of public service and mass communication, the money-making or, rather, money-subjected eye remains glued to the permanent scenario of the effect- and/or production-valued image.

Documentary is said to have come about as a need to inform the people (Dziga Vertov’s Kino-Pravda or Camera-Truth), and subsequently to
have affirmed itself as a reaction against the monopoly that the movie as
entertainment came to have on the uses of film. Cinema was redefined as
an ideal medium for social indoctrination and comment, whose virtues lay
in its capacity for “observing and selecting from life itself,” for “opening
up the screen on the real world,” for photographing “the living scene
and the living story,” for giving cinema “power over a million and one
images,” as well as for achieving “an intimacy of knowledge and effect
impossible to the shamsmechanics of the studio and the lily-fingered
interpretation of the metropolitan actor” (John Grierson). Asserting
its independence from the studio and the star system, documentary has its
raison d’être in a strategic distinction. It puts the social function of film
on the market. It takes real people and real problems from the real world
and deals with them. It sets a value on intimate observation and assesses
its worth according to how well it succeeds in capturing reality on the run,
“without material interference, without intermediary.” Powerful living
stories, infinite authentic situations. There are no retakes. The stage is
thus no more no less than life itself. With the documentary approach the
film gets back to its fundamentals. . . . By selection, elimination and
coordination of natural elements, a film form evolves which is original
and not bound by theatrical or literary tradition. . . . The documentary
film is an original art form. It has come to grips with facts—on its own
original level. It covers the rational side of our lives, from the scientific
experiment to the poetic landscape-study, but never moves away from the
factual (Hans Richter).7

The real world: so real that the Real becomes the one basic referent—
pure, concrete, fixed, visible, all-too-visible. The result is the elaboration
of a whole aesthetic of objectivity and the development of comprehensive
technologies of truth capable of promoting what is right and what is
wrong in the world, and by extension, what is “honest” and what is
“manipulative” in documentary. This involves an extensive and relentless
pursuit of naturalism across all the elements of cinematic technology.
Indispensable to this cinema of the authentic image and spoken word are,
for example, the directional microphone (localizing and restricting in its
process of selecting sound for purposes of decipherability) and the Nagra
portable tape recorder (unrivalled for its maximally faithful ability to
document). Lip-synchronous sound is validated as the norm; it is a “must”;
not so much in replicating reality (this much has been acknowledged
among the fact-makers) as in “showing real people in real locations at real
tasks.” (Even nonsync sounds that are recorded in-context are considered
“less authentic” because the technique of sound synchronization and its
institutionalized use have become “nature” within film culture.) Real time
is thought to be more “truthful” than filmic time; hence the long take (that
is, a take lasting the length of the 400-ft. roll of commercially available
film stock) and minimal or no editing (change at the cutting stage is
“trickery,” as if montage did not happen at the stages of conception
and shooting) are declared to be more appropriate if one is to avoid distortions
in structuring the material. The camera is the switch onto life. Accord-
ingly, the close-up is condemned for its partiality, whereas the wide angle
is claimed to be more objective because it includes more in the frame,
hence it can mirror more faithfully the event-in-context. (The more, the
larger, the truer—as if wider framing is less a framing than tighter shots.)
The lightweight, handheld camera, with its independence of the tripod—
the fixed observation post—is extolled for its ability “to go unnoticed,”
because it must be at once mobile and invisible, integrated into the milieu
so as to change as little as possible, but also able to put its intrusion to
use and provoke people into uttering the “truth” that they would not
otherwise unveil in ordinary situations.

Thousands of bunglers have made the word [documentary] come to
mean a deadly, routine form of film-making, the kind an alienated con-
sumer society might appear to deserve—the art of talking a great deal
during a film, with a commentary imposed from the outside, in order to
say nothing, and to show nothing (Louis Marcorelles).6 The event itself.
Only the event; unaffected, unregulated by the eye recording it and the
eye watching it. The perfectly objective social observer may no longer
stand as the cherished model among documentary-makers today, but with
every broadcast the viewer, Everyman, continues to be taught that He is
first and foremost a Spectator. Either one is not responsible for what one
sees (because only the event presented to him counts) or the only way one
can have some influence on things is to send in a monetary donation.
Thus, though the filmmaker’s perception may readily be admitted as being
unavoidably personal, the objectiveness of the reality of what is seen and
represented remains unchallenged.” [Cinéma-vérité:] it would be better
to call it cinema-sincerity. . . . That is, that you ask the audience to have
confidence in the evidence, to say to the audience, This is what I saw. I
didn’t fake it, this is what happened. . . . I look at what happened with
my subjective eye and this is what I believe took place. . . . It’s a question
of honesty (Jean Rouch).9

What is presented as evidence remains evidence, whether the observing
eye qualifies itself as being subjective or objective. At the core of such a
rationale dwells, untouched, the Cartesian division between subject and
object which perpetuates a dualistic inside-versus-outside, mind-against-
matter view of the world. The emphasis is again laid on the power of film
to capture reality “out there” for us “in here.” The moment of appropriation
and of consumption is either simply ignored or carefully rendered invisible
according to the rules of good and bad documentary. The art of talking to
say nothing goes hand in hand with the will to say and to say only to 
confine something in a meaning. Truth has to be made vivid, interesting; 
it has to be “dramatized” if it is to convince the audience of the evidence, 
whose “confidence” in it allows truth to take shape. Documentary—the 
presentation of actual facts in a way that makes them credible and telling 
to people at the time (William Stott).  

The real? Or the repeated artificial resurrection of the real, an operation 
whose overpowering success in substituting the visual and verbal signs of 
the real for the real itself ultimately helps to challenge the real, thereby 
intensifying the uncertainties engendered by any clear-cut division 
between the two. In the scale of what is more and what is less real, subject 
matter is of primary importance (“It is very difficult if not impossible,” 
says a film festival administrator, “to ask jurors of the documentary film 
category panel not to identify the quality of a film with the subject it 
treats.”) The focus is undeniably on common experience, by which the 
“social” is defined: an experience that features, as a famed documentary-
maker (Pierre Perrault) put it (paternally), “man, simple man, who 
has never expressed himself.”  

The socially oriented filmmaker is thus the almighty voice-giver (here, 
in a vocalizing context that is all male), whose position of authority in the 
production of meaning continues to go unchallenged, skillfully masked as 
it is by its righteous mission. The relationship between mediator and 
medium or, the mediating activity, is either ignored—that is, assumed to 
be transparent, as value free and as insistent as an instrument of reproduction 
ought to be—or else, it is treated most conveniently: by humanizing 
the gathering of evidence so as to further the status quo. (Of course, like 
all human beings I am subjective, but nonetheless, you should have 
confidence in the evidence!) Good documentaries are those whose subject 
matter is “correct” and with whose point of view the viewer agrees. What 
is involved may be a question of honesty (vis-à-vis the material), but it is 
also often a question of (ideological) adherence, hence of legitimation. 

Films made about the common people are furthermore naturally pro-
moted as films made for the same people, and only for them. In the desire 
to service the needs of the unexpressed, there is, commonly enough, the 
urge to define them and their needs. More often than not, for example, 
when filmmakers find themselves in debates in which a film is criticized 
for its simplistic and reductive treatment of a subject, resulting in a 
maintenance of the very status quo which it sets out to challenge, their 
tendency is to dismiss the criticism by claiming that the film is not made 
for “sophisticated viewers like ourselves,” but for a general audience,” 
thereby situating themselves above and apart from the real audience, those 
“out there,” the undoubtedly simple-minded folks who need everything 
they see explained to them. Despite the shift of emphasis—from the world 
of the upwardly mobile and the very affluent that dominates the media to 
that of “their poor”—what is maintained intact is the age-old opposition etween the creative intelligent supplier and the mediocre unenlightened 
consumer. The pretext for perpetuating such a division is the belief that 
social relations are determinate, hence endowed with objectivity. By 
“impossibility of the social” I understand . . . the assertion of the ultimate 
impossibility of all “objectivity” . . . society presents itself, to a great 
degree, not as an objective, harmonious order, but as an ensemble of 
divergent forces which do not seem to obey any unified or unifying logic. 
How can this experience of the failure of objectivity be made compatible 
with the affirmation of an ultimate objectivity of the real? (Ernesto 
Laclau).  

The silent common people—those who “have never expressed them-
sew themselves” unless they are given the opportunity to voice their thoughts by 
the one who comes to redeem them—are constantly summoned to signify 
the real world. They are the fundamental referent of the social; hence, it 
suffices to point the camera at them, to show their (industrialized) poverty, 
or to contextualize and package their unfamiliar life-styles for the ever-
buying and donating general audience “back here,” in order to enter the 
sanctified realm of the morally right, or the social. In other words, when 
the so-called “social” reigns, how these people(we) come to visibility in 
the media, how meaning is given to their(our) lives, how their(our) truth 
is construed or how truth is laid down for them(us) and despite them(us), 
how representation relates to or is ideology, how media hegemony 
continues its relentless course is simply not at issue. 

There isn’t any cinéma-vérité. It’s necessarily a lie, from the moment 
the director intervenes—or it isn’t cinema at all. (George Franju) 

When the social is hypostatized and enshrined as an ideal of transpar-
ency, when it itself becomes commodified in a form of sheer administration 
(better service, better control), the interval between the real and the 
image(d) or between the real and the rational shrinks to the point of 
unreality. Thus, to address the question of production relations as raised 
earlier is endlessly to reopen the question: How is the real (or the social 
ideal of good representation) produced? Rather than catering to, striving 
to capture and discover its truth as a concealed or lost object, it is therefore 
important also to keep on asking: How is truth being ruled? The penalty 
of realism is that it is about reality and has to bother for ever not about 
being “beautiful” but about being right (John Grierson).  
The fathers of documentary have initially insisted that documentary is not News, but Art 
(a “new and vital art form” as Grierson once proclaimed). That its essence 
is not information (as with “the hundreds of tweedle-dum ‘industrials’ or
worker-education films”); not reportage; not newsreels; but something close to “a creative treatment of actuality” (Grierson’s renowned definition). Joris Ivens has made the most beautiful documentaries that anyone has ever seen, that’s because the films are composed, worked out, and they have an air of truth. Sure the documentary part is true, but all around the documentary sections there’s an interpretation. And then you can’t talk about cinéma-vérité (Georges Franju).\(^5\)

Documentary may be anti-aesthetic, as some still affirm in the line of the British forerunner, but it is claimed to be no less an art, albeit an art within the limits of factuality. (Interpretation, for example, is not viewed as constituting the very process of documenting and making information accessible; it is thought, instead, to be the margin all around an untouched given center, which according to Franju is the “documentary part” or “documentary section.”) When, in a world of reification, truth is widely equated with fact, any explicit use of the magic, poetic, or irrational qualities specific to the film medium itself would have to be excluded a priori as nonfactual. The question is not so much one of sorting out—illusory as this may be—what is inherently factual and what is not, in a body of preexisting filmic techniques, as it is one of abiding by the conventions of naturalism in film. In the reality of formula-films, only validated techniques are right, others are de facto wrong. The criteria are all based on their degree of invisibility in producing meaning. Thus, shooting at any speed other than the standard 24 frames per second (the speed necessitated for lip-sync sound) is, for example, often condemned as a form of manipulation, implying thereby that manipulativeness has to be discreet—that is, acceptable only when not easily perceptible to the “real audience.” Although the whole of filmmaking is a question of manipulation—whether “creative” or not—again, those endorsing the law unhesitatingly decree which technique is manipulative and which, supposedly, is not; and this judgment is certainly made according to the degree of visibility of each. A documentary film is shot with three cameras: 1) the camera in the technical sense; 2) the filmmaker’s mind; and 3) the generic patterns of the documentary film, which are founded on the expectations of the audience that patronizes it. For this reason one cannot simply say that the documentary film portrays facts. It photographs isolated facts and assembles from them a coherent set of facts according to three divergent schemata. All remaining possible facts and factual contexts are excluded. The naïve treatment of documentation therefore provides a unique opportunity to concoct fables. In and of itself, the documentary is no more realistic than the feature film (Alexander Kluge).\(^6\)

Reality is more fabulous, more maddening, more strangely manipulative than fiction. To understand this is to recognize the naivety of a development of cinematic technology that promotes increasing unmediated “access” to reality. It is to see through the poverty of what Benjamin deplored as “a truth expressed as it was thought” and to understand why progressive fiction films are attracted and constantly pay tribute to documentary techniques. These films put the “documentary effect” to advantage, playing on the viewer’s expectation in order to “concoct fables.” (Common examples of this effect include: the feeling of participating in a truth-like moment of reality captured despite the filmed subject; the sense of urgency, immediacy, and authenticity in the instability of the handheld camera; the newsreel look of the grainy image; and the oral-testimony-like quality of the direct interview—to mention just a few.)

The documentary can thus easily become a “style”: it no longer constitutes a mode of production or an attitude toward life, but proves to be only an element of aesthetics (or anti-aesthetics)—which at best and without acknowledging it, it tends to be in any case when, within its own factual limits, it reduces itself to a mere category, or a set of persuasive techniques. Many of these techniques have become so “natural” to the language of broadcast television today that they “go unnoticed.” These are, for example: the “personal testimony” technique (a star appears on screen to advertise his/her use of a certain product); the “plain folks” technique (a politician arranges to eat hot dogs in public); the “band wagon” technique (the use of which conveys the message that “everybody is doing it, why not you?”); or the “card stacking” technique (in which rearrangements for a “survey” shows that a certain brand of product is more popular than any other to the inhabitants of a given area).\(^7\)

You must re-create reality because reality runs away; reality denies reality. You must first interpret it, or re-create it. . . . When I make a documentary, I try to give the realism an artificial aspect. . . . I find that the aesthetic of a document comes from the artificial aspect of the document . . . it has to be more beautiful than realism, and therefore it has to be composed . . . to give it another sense (Franju).\(^8\) A documentary aware of its own artifice is one that remains sensitive to the flow between fact and fiction. It does not work to conceal or exclude what is normalized as “nonfactual,” for it understands the mutual dependence of realism and “artificiality” in the process of filmmaking. It recognizes the necessity of composing (on) life in living it or making it. Documentary reduced to a mere vehicle of facts may be used to advocate a cause, but it does not constitute one in itself; hence, the perpetuation of the bipartite system of division in the content-versus-form rationale.

To compose is not always synonymous with ordering-so-as-to-persuade, and to give the filmed document another sense, another meaning, is not necessarily to distort it. If life’s paradoxes and complexities are not
to be suppressed, the question of degrees and nuances is incessantly crucial. Therefore, meaning can be political only when it does not let itself be easily stabilized and when it does not rely on any single source of authority, but, rather, empties it, or decentralizes it. Thus, even when this source is referred to, it stands as one among many others, at once plural and utterly singular. In its demand to mean at any rate, the “documentary” often forgets how it comes about and how aesthetics and politics remain inseparable in its constitution; for, when not equated with mere techniques of beautifying, aesthetics allows one to experience life differently or, as some would say, to give it “another sense,” remaining in tune with its drifts and shifts.

*It must be possible to represent reality as the historical fiction it is. Reality is a paper-tiger. The individual does encounter it, as fate. It is not fate, however, but a creation of the labor of generations of human beings, who all the time wanted and still want something entirely different. In more than one respect, reality is simultaneously real and unreal.* (Alexander Kluge)\(^9\)

From its descriptions to its arrangements and rearrangements, reality on the move may be heightened or impoverished but it is never neutral (that is, objectivist). “Documentary at its purest and most poetic is a form in which the elements that you use are the actual elements”\(^7\) Why, for example, use the qualifying term “artificial” at all? In the process of producing a “document,” is there such a thing as an artificial aspect that can be securely separated from the true aspect (except for analytical purpose—that is, for another “artifice” of language)? In other words, is a closer framing of reality more artificial than a wider one? The notion of “making strange” and of reflexivity remains but a mere distancing device as long as the division between “textual artifice” and “social attitude” exerts its power.\(^9\) The “social” continues to go unchallenged, history keeps on being salvaged, while the sovereignty of the socio-historicizing subject is safely maintained. With the status quo of the making/consuming subject preserved, the aim is to correct “errors” (the false) and to construct an alternative view (offered as a this-is-the-true or mine-is-truer version of reality). It is, in other words, to replace one source of unacknowledged authority by another, but not to challenge the very constitution of authority. The new sociohistorical text, thus, rules despoticly as another master-centered text because it unwittingly helps to perpetuate the Master’s ideological stance.

When the textual and the political neither separate themselves from one another nor simply collapse into a single qualifier, the practice of representation can, similarly, neither be taken for granted nor merely dismissed as being ideologically reactionary. By putting representation under scrutiny, textual theory-practice has more likely helped to upset rooted ideologies by bringing the mechanics of their workings to the fore. It makes possible the vital differentiation between authoritative criticism and uncompromising analyses and inquiries (including those of the analyzing/inquiring activity). Moreover, it contributes to the questioning of reformist “alternative” approaches that never quite depart from the lineage of white- and male-centered humanism. Despite their explicit sociopolitical commitment, these approaches remain unthreatening—that is, “framed,” and, thus, neither social nor political enough.

Reality runs away, reality denies reality. Filmmaking is after all a question of “framing” reality in its course. However, it can also be the very place where the referential function of the film image/sound is not simply negated, but reflected on in its own operative principles and questioned in its authoritative identification with the phenomenal world. In attempts at suppressing the mediation of the cinematic apparatus and the fact that language “communicates itself in itself,” there always lurks what Benjamin qualified as a “bourgeois” conception of language. Any revolutionary strategy must challenge the depiction of reality . . . so that a break between ideology and text is effected (Claire Johnston).\(^2\)

To deny the reality of film in claiming (to capture) reality is to stay “in ideology”—that is, to indulge in the (deliberate or not) confusion of filmic with phenomenal reality. By condemning self-reflexivity as pure formalism instead of challenging its diverse realizations, this ideology can “go on unnoticed,” keeping its operations invisible and serving the goal of universal expansionism. Such aversion for self-reflexivity goes hand in hand with its widespread appropriation as a progressive formalistic device in cinema because both work to reduce its function to a harmlessly decorative one. (For example, it has become commonplace to hear such remarks as “A film is a film” or “This is a film about a film.” Film-on-film statements are increasingly challenging to work with as they can easily fall prey to their own formulas and techniques.) Furthermore, reflexivity, at times equated with personal view, is at other times endorsed as scientific rigor.

*Two men were discussing the joint production of wine. One said to the other: “You shall supply the rice and I the water.” The second asked: “If all the rice comes from me, how shall we apportion the finished product?” The first man replied: “I shall be absolutely fair about the whole thing. When the wine is finished, each gets back exactly what he puts in—I’ll siphon off the liquid and you can keep the rest.”*

“Joint Production,”
Wit and Humor from Old Cathay\(^2\)
One of the areas of documentary that remains most resistant to the reality of film as film is that known as anthropological filmmaking. Filmed ethnographic material, which was thought to “replicate natural perception,” has now renounced its authority to replicate only to purport to provide adequate “data” for the “sampling” of culture. The claim to objectivity may no longer stand in many anthropological circles, but its authority is likely to be replaced by the sacrosanct notion of the “scientific.” Thus, the recording and gathering of data and of people’s testimonies are considered to be the limited aim of “ethnographic film.” What makes a film anthropological and what makes it scientific is, tautologically enough, its “scholarly endeavour” to respectively document and interpret according to anthropological standards.”

Not merely ethnographic nor documentary, the definition positively specifies, but scholarly and anthropologically. The fundamental scientific obsession is present in every attempt to demarcate anthropology’s territories. To be scientifically valid, a film needs the scientific intervention of the anthropologist, for it is only by adhering to the body of conventions set up by the community of anthropologists accredited by their “discipline” that the film can hope to qualify for the classification and be passed as a “scholarly endeavor.”

The myth of science impresses us. But do not confuse science with its scholasticism. Science finds no truths, either mathematized or formalized; it discovers unknown facts that can be interpreted in a thousand ways (Paul Veyne). One of the familiar arguments given by anthropologists to validate the prescriptively instrumental use of film and of people is to dismiss all works by filmmakers who are “not professional anthropologists” or “amateur ethnographers” under the pretext that they are not “anthropologically informed,” hence they have “no theoretical significance from an anthropological point of view.” To advance such a blatantly self-promoting rationale to institute a deadly routine form of filmmaking (to quote a sentence of Marcrocelleres once more) is also—through anthropology’s primary task of “collecting data” for knowledge of mankind—to try to skirt what is known as the salvage paradigm and the issues implicated in the “scientific” deployment of Western world ownership. The stronger anthropology’s insecurity about its own project, the greater its eagerness to hold up a normative model, and the more seemingly serene its disposition to dwell in its own blind spots.

In the sanctified terrain of anthropology, all of filmmaking is reduced to a question of methodology. It is demonstrated that the reason anthropological films go further than ethnographic films is because they do not, for example, just show activities being performed, but they also explain the “anthropological significance” of these activities (significance that, despite the disciplinary qualifier “anthropological,” is de facto identified with the meaning the natives give them themselves). Now, obviously, in the process of fixing meaning, not every explanation is valid. This is where the role of the expert anthropologist comes in and where methodologies need to be devised, legitimated, and enforced. For, if a nonprofessional explanation is dismissed here, it is not so much because it lacks insight or theoretical grounding, as because it escapes anthropological control; it lacks the seal of approval from the anthropological order. In the name of science, a distinction is made between reliable and nonreliable information. Anthropological and nonanthropological explanations may share the same subject matter, but they differ in the way they produce meaning. The unreliable constructs are the ones that do not obey the rules of anthropological authority, which a concerned expert like Evans-Pritchard skillfully specifies as being nothing else but “a scientific habit of mind.” Science defined as the most appropriate approach to the object of investigation serves as a banner for every scientific attempt to promote the West’s paternalistic role as subject of knowledge and its historicity of the Same. The West agrees with us today that the way to Truth passes by numerous paths, other than Aristotelian Thumistic logic or Hegelian dialectic. But social and human sciences themselves must be decolonized (E. Mveng). In its scientific “quest to make meaning,” anthropology constantly reactivates the power relations embedded in the Master’s confident discourses on Himself and His Other, thereby aiding both the cenripetal and centrifugal movement of their global spread. With the diverse challenges issued today to the very process of producing “scientific” interpretation of culture as well as to that of making anthropological knowledge possible, visually oriented members of its community have come up with an epistemological position in which the notion of reflexivity is typically reduced to a question of technique and method. Equated with a form of self-exposure common in field work, it is discussed at times as self-reflectivity and at other times condemned as individualistic idealism sorely in need of being counteracted if the individual maker is not to loom larger than the scientific community or the people observed. Thus, “being reflexive is virtually synonymous with being scientific.”

The reasons justifying such a statement are many, but one that can be read through it and despite it is: as long as the maker abides by a series of “reflexive” techniques in filmmaking that are devised for the purpose of exposing the “context” of production and as long as the required techniques are method(ologically) carried out, the maker can be assured that “reflexivity” is elevated to that status of scientific rigor. These reflexive techniques would include the insertion of a verbal or visual narrative about the anthropologist, the methodology adopted, and the condition of production—in other words, all the conventional means of validating an
anthropological text through the disciplinary practice of head-and footnoteing and the totalistic concept of preproduction presentation. Those who reject such a rationale do so out of a preoccupation with the “community of scientists,” whose collective judgment they feel should be the only true form of reflection; for an individual validation of a work can only be suspect because it “ignores the historical development of science.” In these constant attempts at enforcing anthropology as (a) discipline and at recentering the dominant representation of culture (despite all the changes in methodologies), what seems to be oddly suppressed in the notion of reflexivity in filmmaking is its practice as processes to prevent meaning from ending with what is said and what is shown—as inquiries into production relations—thereby to challenge representation itself while emphasizing the reality of the experience of film as well as the important role that reality plays in the lives of the spectators.

Unless an image displaces itself from its natural state, it acquires no significance. Displacement causes resonance (Shanta Gokhale). 30

After his voluntary surrender, Zheng Guang, a pirate operating off the coast of Fujian, was to be given an official post (in return for surrendering). When a superior instructed him to write a poem, Zheng replied with a doggerel: “No matter whether they are civil or military officers they are all the same. The officials assumed their posts before becoming thieves, but I, Zheng Guang, was a thief before becoming an official.”

“The Significance of Officialdom,” Wit and Humor from Old Cathay 31

As an aesthetic closure or an old relativizing gambit in the process nonetheless of absolutizing meaning, reflexivity proves critically insignificant when it merely serves to refine and to further the accumulation of knowledge. No going beyond, no elsewhere—within her seems possible if the reflection on oneself is not at one and the same time the analysis of established forms of the social that define one’s limits. Thus, to drive the self into an abyss is neither a moralistic stricture against oneself (for future improvement) nor a task of critique that humanizes the decoding self but never challenges the very notion of self and decoder. Left intact in its positionality and its fundamental urge to decree meaning, the self conceived both as key and as transparent mediator is more often than not likely to turn responsibility into license. The license to name, as though meaning presented itself to be deciphered without any ideological mediation. As though specifying a context can only result in the finalizing of what is shown and said. As though naming can stop the process of naming—that very abyss of the relation of self to self.

The bringing of the self into play necessarily exceeds the concern for human errors, for it cannot but involve as well the problem inherent in representation and communication. Radically plural in its scope, reflexivity is, thus, not a mere question of rectifying and justifying (subjectivizing.) What is set in motion in its praxis are the self-generating links between different forms of reflexivity. Thus, a subject who points to him/her/itself as subject-in-process, a work that displays its own formal properties or its own constitution as work, is bound to upset one’s sense of identity—the familiar distinction between the Same and the Other because the latter is no longer kept in a recognizable relation of dependence, derivation, or appropriation. The process of self-constitution is also that in which the self vacillates and loses its assurance. The paradox of such a process lies in its fundamental instability; an instability that brings forth the disorder inherent to every order. The “core” of representation is the reflexive interval. It is the place in which the play within the textual frame is a play on this very frame, hence on the borderlines of the textual and extratextual, where a positioning within constantly incurs the risk of depositioning, and where the work, never freed from historical and sociopolitical contexts nor entirely subjected to them, can only be itself by constantly risking being non-speaking.

A work that reflects back on itself offers itself infinitely as nothing else but work . . . and void. Its gaze is at once an impulse that causes the work to fall apart (to return to the initial no-work-ness) and an ultimate gift to its constitution; a gift, by which the work is freed from the tyranny of meaning as well as from the omnipresence of a subject of meaning. To let go of the hold at the very moment when it is at its most effective is to allow the work to live, and to live on independently of the intended links, communicating itself in itself like Benjamin’s “the self is a text”—no more no less “a project to be built.” 32 Orpheus’ gaze . . . is the impulse of desire which shatters the song’s destiny and concern, and in that inspired and unconcerned decision reaches the origin, consecrates the song (Maurice Blanchot). 33

Meaning can neither be imposed nor denied. Although every film is in itself a form of ordering and closing, each closure can defy its only closure, opening onto other closures, thereby emphasizing the interval between apertures and creating a space in which meaning remains fascinated by what escapes and exceeds it. The necessity to let go of the notion of intentionality that dominates the question of the “social” as well as that of creativity cannot, therefore, be confused with the ideal of non-intervention, an ideal in relation to which the filmmaker, trying to become as invisible as possible in the process of producing meaning, promotes empathetic subjectivity at the expense of critical inquiry even when the intention is to show and to condemn oppression. It is idealist mystification to believe
that “truth” can be captured by the camera or that the conditions of a film’s production (e.g., a film made collectively by women) can of itself reflect the conditions of its production. This is mere utopianism: new meaning has to be manufactured within the text of the film. . . . What the camera in fact grasps is the “natural” world of the dominant ideology (Claire Johnston). 34

In the quest for totalized meaning and for knowledge-for-knowledge’s sake, the worst meaning is meaninglessness. A Caucasian missionary nun based in a remote village of Africa qualifies her task in these simple, confident terms: “We are here to help people give meaning to their lives.” Ownership is monotonously circular in its give-and-take demands. It is a monolithic view of the world whose irrationality expresses itself in the imperative of both giving and meaning, and whose irreality manifests itself in the need to require that visual and verbal constructs yield meaning down to their last detail. The West moistens everything with meaning, like an authoritarian religion which imposes baptism on entire peoples (Roland Barthes). 35 Yet such illusion is real; it has its own reality, one in which the subject of Knowledge, the subject of Vision, or the subject of Meaning continues to deploy established power relations, assuming Himself to be the basic reserve of reference in the totalistic quest for the referent, the true referent that lies out there in nature, in the dark, waiting patiently to be unveiled and deciphered correctly: To be redeemed. Perhaps then, an imagination that goes toward the texture of reality is one capable of playing upon the illusion in question and the power it exerts. The production of one irreality on the other and the play of nonsense (which is not mere meaninglessness) upon meaning may, therefore, help to relieve the basic referent of its occupation, for the present situation of critical inquiry seems much less one of attacking the illusion of reality as one of displacing and emptying out the establishment of totality.