Notes

My initial thinking on the topic of this article was inspired by Rubin, "Of Catamites and Kings"; I owe a much larger debt to Rubin's article than could possibly be reflected by specific citations. I am grateful to Michael M. Hernandez, Rebecca Rugg, and Ben Singer for productive suggestions on earlier versions of this article, and to Carolyn Dinshaw for careful, thoughtful, and incisive editorial guidance. For helpful discussions of some of the topics in this article or for assistance locating references, I also thank Guy Baldwin, Spencer Bergstedt, Talia Beetcher, Nan Alamilla Boyd, Dexter Day, Holly Devor, Michael A. Gilbert, Cathy Greenblatt, Valerie Harvey, Eloise Klein Healy, Jordan Jaeger, Jordy Jones, Lee Lambert, C. Michael Munson, Gayle Rubin, Naomi Scheman, Eve K. Sedgwick, and Jeffrey Shevlowitz. Without Judith Halberstam's generous, acute, and encouraging collaborative engagement, this article would not exist.

1. Throughout this article I use *ftm* as a primitive (undefined) term. As Michael M. Hernandez pointed out to me, some people do not use *ftm* as an abbreviation meaning "female-to-male" but as a general rubric for any number of potential life trajectories, not just the transsexual ones. Others use it in nonstandard abbreviatory ways such as "female-to(ward)-male." I intend the nonstandard, lowercase use of *ftm* to disrupt assumptions about the term's abbreviatory function. When used adjectively, *ftm* may modify either *transgendered* or *transsexual* (or both, when *transsexual* is viewed as a subcategory of *transgendered*). In the United States, some people prefer *mtm* ("male-to-male") as a self-identificatory term to indicate that they are acquiring male embodiments in line with their already male self-identifications. This is a point, like many in this article, for which I cannot supply adequate citations because much of newly forming, contested *ftm* community discourse circulates through informal conversations and on-line, on E-mail lists and on community bulletin boards. Such conversations carry the presumption of confidentiality, and many are not intended to be open to non-FTMs.

While I use the construction "butch/ftm border zone" in this article, I am not entirely comfortable with it. As Cathy Greenblatt pointed out to me, this construction might reinscribe the notion that each person has no more than one sexual identity. It also threatens to leave in place heteronormative assumptions about FTMs generally, to erase the specificities of FTMs who do not have lesbian histories, and to produce "Teena Brandon"/"Brandon Teena" in particular as a stoned butch/heterosexual ftm border zone figure. The latter construction risks foreclosing outcomes that include erotic attractions to men by eliding those parts of the young Nebraskan's history that include attractions to boys during high school (Aphrodite Jones, *All She Wanted* [New York: Pocket Books, 1996], 49), ease with having close gay male friends (92, 104–5), enjoyment of gay male bars (92), and acceptance of being called one of Grandma's

I am somewhat uncomfortable with my factual reliance on Aphrodite Jones, because she does not have extensive knowledge of trans communities. However, since she has done more extensive primary research than any of the other authors of the representations currently available and since it is less obvious that her representations are tailored to any one identity-based agenda than is the case with most other representations, I take her work to be more reliable with regard to points of fact than any of the others.


24. I thank Eloise Klein Healy for pointing me toward the word necrophagia, meaning
“eating the dead.” Meanings of all of the terms in this list are contested. The term cross-dresser is more closely aligned with organizations of heterosexual males who have adopted this nomenclature to distance themselves from notions of fetishistic transvestism understood as a paraphilia (a sexual deviation or perversion) within psychiatric nosology, as well as from homosexuality and transsexuality.


32. I thank Allucquére Rosanne Stone for coining *virophagia* to mean “eating the living.” Her neologism compellingly captures tensions about who owns and controls masculine virilities, especially those that play out around sexuality and discursive power in people assigned female at birth.


37. Some *ftm* take on the identity of a transsexual understood as distinct from “man” or “woman” (Jayne County with Rupert Smith, *Man Enough to Be a Woman* [New York: Serpent’s Tail, 1996], 139); Kim Harlow and Bettina Rheims, *Kim*, trans. Paul Gould (Munich: Gina Kehayoff, 1994), 27; this is not to be conflated with identity as a transsexual man or a transsexual woman. I have not heard of any *ftm* who self-identify as transsexual *simpliciter*, though some might. Perhaps this self-identification is less attractive to *ftm* than to *mtf* because transsexuality unmarked is *ftm* transsexuality. No doubt there are other *ftm* self-identifications than those I have listed in my text.


45. Morris and Brown, “The Alan Lucill Hart Story,” 14. The contrast drawn by Morris and Brown commits the fallacy of false dichotomy by misrepresenting the range of historically specific conceptions of transsexuality as if they all encoded surgery as necessary and sufficient for membership in the category “transsexual.” More careful views that insist on historical specificity focus on the ways in which the invention of “sex change surgery” enabled the introduction and development of the concept “transsexual” and thus the existence of the members of the social category “transsexual” as members of this category.


48. My use of authentic and inauthentic should not be taken to imply that I am invoking any modernist notion of an essential, transtemporal, transhistorical, transcultural self. Clearly, lying about oneself—e.g., claiming that I have an unambiguously male past—can meaningfully be labeled “inauthentic” without invoking modernist notions of enduring, essential selves: this would be a false report of my socially constructed place within the social order. Additionally, I do not intend this discussion to suggest that gender play is in any way inauthentic or trivial.


50. Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 63.


53. Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto,” Camera Obscura: A Journal of Feminism and Film Theory 29 (May 1992): 151–76, quotation on 166. This stands in odd juxtaposition with psychoanalytic notions according to which a woman’s subjectivity is constituted by penis envy.


56. Identifications with, as, and as-not can be partial, incomplete, mediated, or crossed. This becomes clear in José Esteban Muñoz's exposition of his different though related notion of disidentification (José Esteban Muñoz, "Famous and Dandy like B. 'n' Andy: Race, Pop, and Basquiat," in *Pop Out: Queer Warhol*, ed. Jennifer Doyle, Jonathan Flatley, and José Esteban Muñoz [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996], 145) and in Diana Fuss's *Identification Papers* (Routledge: New York, 1995). As I have already noted, some fms identify partially as lesbians, some identify partially as women, some identify only incompletely as men.


60. Excessive masculinities are not necessarily "extremely masculine" masculinities; figuring masculinity as a hierarchy or even as a continuum or a spectrum is misleading here. Stone butches, butch faggots (butches who desire other butches), ftm drag queens, and ftms who use their vaginas for sexual pleasure all test the limits of acceptable dyke or ftm masculinities, hence they all express excessive masculinities. See David Harrison, quoted in Natã, *Lesbians Talk Transgender*, 25.


62. This has become so ubiquitous in postmodern theory that it is perhaps not inaccurate to take it as a hallmark of such theory. A classic example is Donna J. Haraway's use of cyborg metaphors to break down boundaries between human/animal, organism/machine, and physical/nonphysical (Donna J. Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialism-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: On the Reinvention of Nature* [New York: Routledge, 1991], 149–81).

63. After providing a deconstructive critique of lesbian identity, Shane Phelan writes: "Voters in Colorado, or homophobes with baseball bats, will not be persuaded by discussions of gender ambiguity; I suspect it will exacerbate their anxiety. Telling them that I am not 'really' a lesbian is different from saying it to readers of *Signs*; what a *Signs* audience can understand as deconstruction becomes simply a return to the closet in others' eyes" (Shane Phelan, "[Re]coming Out: Lesbian Identity and Politics," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 18, no. 4 [1993]: 765–90, quotation on 782).

64. In one of her articles, Stryker considers transsexuality "to be a culturally and historically specific transgender practice/identity through which a transgendered subject enters into a relationship with medical, psychotherapeutic, and juridical institutions in order to gain access to certain hormonal and surgical techniques for enacting and embodying itself" (Susan Stryker, "My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chanounix: Performing Transgender Rage," *GLQ* 1 [1994]: 237–54, quotation on 251–52 n. 2). In other contexts, e.g., on the Transsexual Menace E-mail list and in pri-
vate E-mail messages, Stryker has given slightly different definitions that all foreground cultural and historical specificity with regard to medically regulated technologies but differ in how this aspect is related to others. She elucidated her position on the use of definitions to me in private E-mail communication.


66. Hale, “Are Lesbians Women?”


68. Phelan, “(Be)coming Out,” 771.

69. Scheman, “Queering the Center.”


71. “Explicitly technologized or performative sex/gender embodiments and subjectivities” is not a cryptic code for *transsexual*, thus this use of language is not an attempt to sneak a covert definition of *transsexual* nor even a loose characterization of *transsexual* into my analysis. Instead, I use this language to flag two ranges of overlapping discursive differences between normatively gendered persons: those whose sex/gender statuses are hegrenomically constructed as something that simply is, and those of us for whom some of our sex/gender manifestations are hegrenomically constructed within dominant discourses as something that we do or that is done to us.

72. My thinking here is indebted deeply to Ben Singer.

73. Prosser, “No Place Like Home,” 508.


75. Halberstam, “F2M.”


77. “Posttranssexual” should not be confused with “formerly transsexual.” The latter is used to indicate that one’s process of movement into one’s gender of choice is complete; according to this construction, one has finished the process of transition and thus is no longer transsexual but now a (complete) man or woman. The former was introduced by Sandy Stone to indicate, as Prosser puts it, a movement “beyond the current inscription of transsexuality with its imperative on passing and the consequent absence of *transsexual subjectivity*” (Prosser, “No Place Like Home,” 504; cf. Stone, “Empire Strikes Back,” 151–76). I use it, more generally, to indicate politically motivated movement beyond current constructions of transsexuality that are politically problematic in any way.